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21 )  I NT RODUCT I ON
According to the Bertrand paradox ''two is enough for competitive outcomes''. This
result however is well-known to rely on the hypothesis of constant marginal cost and for
this reason lacks any generality (this critique of Bertrand [1883] dates at least back to
Edgeworth [1925]). Still, this paradox is often contrasted with the Cournot outcomes and
reconciling these two approaches has been the aim of many papers. The most spectacular
result in this field is to be found in Kreps & Scheinkman [1983] (hereafter KS). Two firms
invest in capacities and then compete in prices with constant marginal cost up to capacity
and an abritrarily large marginal cost above capacity; investing into limited capacity has a
strategic value because it amounts to commit not to be aggressive in the pricing game. KS
reconciliate the Cournot and Bertrand approaches by showing that the Cournot outcome is
the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of their game. This result also has been much
criticized. In particular because of the particular rationing rule, the efficient one, retained
for the analysis. Still, the fact that capacity commitment relaxes price competition and
drives equilibrium outcomes towards cournotian ones is much less controversial.
An open question remains: to which extent is the "rigid capacity" assumption central
for this result to hold? In other words, would smoothly increasing marginal cost (or weaker
forms of quantitative constraints) lead to similar outcomes? This question is interesqting
from a purely theoretical point of view but it also belongs to the class of generalizations
that seem necessary to pursue robust empirical studies on oligopolistic markets. As argued
for instance by Tirole [1988] (chap. 5, p.244), "the Bertrand and Cournot models should not
be viewed as two rival models giving contradictory predictions of the outcome of
competition in a given market. (After all, firms almost always compete in prices.) Rather,
they are meant to depict markets with different cost structures." It seems fair however to
say that a rigorous link between the shape of marginal cost and equilibrium price is still
missing under strategi price competition. The main goal of the present paper consists
precisely in showing how the whole range of prices, from Bertrand towards Cournot ones,
can be sustained as equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic industries, depending on the
shape of marginal costs.
Price competition under decreasing returns to scale, or weaker forms of capacity
constraints, has been recently studied in the literature. Klemperer and Meyer [1989] have
sdhed light on this issue using the concept of supply -function equilibrium. In their model
however, the price is not fully strategic in the sense that they are intemately related to
supply. Dastidar [1995], [1997] considers a price Bertrand competition with continuously
3increasing marginal costs and homogeneous products. Maggi [1996] introduces imperfect
commitment in capacity games using the set up developed by Dixit [1980] in a market for
differentiated products. In his model, marginal cost is modelled as a stepwise,
discontinuous function, being constant up to the capacity level where it jumps up to a
higher level. Maggi  obtain a "cournotian-like" outcome in his unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. Still, both Maggi's and Dastidar's result does not compare at all with that of KS
and more generally with the standard literature on capacity-constrained pricing games
because they totally rule out any form of rationing.
Whether firms are allowed to ration consumers or not is central when studying price
competition under decreasing returns to scale. From a technical point of view, it is well-
known that rationing tends to destroy payoffs' concavity, and therefore pure strategy
equilibria.  Under weak forms of capacity constraints (such as those retained by Dastidar
and Maggi) producing beyond capacities is always feasible but not necessarily profitable.
We are inclined to believe that firms should be allowed not to meet full demand whenever
this last strategy is profitable. As a consequence, we will allow for consumers' rationing.
 In the next section, we extend the KS result to the case of imperfect commitment
and many firms. To this end we retain the cost framework put forward by Dixit [1980] and
Maggi [1996]. The chief merit of the cost structure proposed by these authors is that it
allows us to parametrize the commitment value of capacities by the height of the upward
jump in marginal cost. Firms commit to capacities in a first stage and then compete in price
in the second stage. In the second stage, they may produce beyond installed capacity but
have to incur for this an extra unit cost, denoted by θ. The subgame perfect equilibria of this
game exhibit the following features.  If the marginal cost θ of producing beyond capacity is
larger than Cournot price, then Cournot equilibrium always obtain in the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium.  If θ is less than the cournot price, there is a continuum of subgame
perfect equilibria but the price on the equilibrium path is always θ which implies that the
aggregate quantity converges toward the Bertrand-competitive solution at the limit θ = 0. In
other words, capacity has its full commitment value whenever producing beyond capacity
entails an additional unit cost at least equal to the corresponding Cournot price. The lower
the value of the additional unit cost, the closer the price to the competitive benchmark.
42 )  BERT RA ND- EDGEWORT H COMPET I T I ON A ND
I MPERFECT  COMMI T MENT
The game tree we are considering is identical to that of KS. Some n ≥ 2 firms
choose some costly capacities and then compete in price in the market for an homogeneous
product. Rationing, if any, is organized according to the efficient rationing rule.  Under the
efficient rationing rule, low pricing firms get served first and ties are broken evenly. The
firm exhibiting the highest price is left with a residual demand (if any) which is simply
defined as a function of the other firms' aggregate capacity.
The cost structure in the pricing game is borrowed from Dixit [1980]. The marginal
cost up to the capacity level is w.l.o.g. zero while it is some positive θ beyond (this jump
typically measures the legal wage gap for overtime work). Thus, in our capacity-price game
tree, firms invest in capacities xi at cost c(xi) and then compete in prices for the demand
function D(.) with the same cost structure mc q if q x
if q xi
i
i
( ) = ≤
>

0
θ  for all i ≤ n.
Note that Dixit [1980] uses this set-up under quantity competition whereas Maggi
[1996] retains it for analyzing price competition under product differentiation. Note also,
that the original KS model corresponds to the particular case where θ is infinite; observe
also that any value larger than the zero-demand market clearing price D-1(0) would trivially
yield their result.
As a benchmark we consider the basic model of Cournot oligopolistic competition
among n firms having the same convex cost function c(.). The aggregate consumer demand
is D(p), its inverse P(x). Let 
  
x xi jj i− ≠
≡ ∑  be the total quantity produced by firm i's
opponents. A nil production is clearly optimal if x
-i > D(0), otherwise firm i's profit is
x P x x c xi i i i( ) ( )+ −− . We assume throughout that xP(x+z) is concave in x  for all z .
Therefore, the profit maximizing quantity rc(x-i) is unique and decreasing1 in x-i. We
denote r(x
-i) the best reply with zero production cost, it will play a central role in the study
of price competition. The symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the solution x < D(0)/n
of x r n xc= −( )( )1 . For instance, with constant marginal cost c and linear demand P(z) = 1 −
z, we get r zc c z( )= − −1 2  and  x = 1 1−+cn .
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5We are now in a position to solve the two-stage game with imperfect capacity
commitment and price competition. The particular shape of marginal costs affects the
analysis of price subgames. Recall that the Edgeworth's argument consists in showing that
upwards price deviation may be profitable when other firms are likely to ration consumers.
This requires first that the demand addressed to them exceeds their aggregate capacity and
second that they are not willing to meet demand beyond capacity. In the KS model, the
second condition is always satisfied since the cost of producing beyond capacity is
prohibitive whereas this is no longer the case in our model: a firm is willing to meet any
level of demand, beyond its installed capacity provided the price is above θ. It is only for
prices below that level that the Edgeworth's argument applies, otherwise the standard
Bertrand analysis applies.
Figure 1 below helps to understand the nature of price competition. Consider the
case of two fims. A firm will perform rationing if its price is less than θ, which makes it
unprofitable to sell beyond capacity, and if the demand it faces is larger than its capacity,
thus the relevant threshold for rationing is min ,θ 1−{ }ki . In the region where the two firms
name price above their respective treshold, a standard Bertrand competition applies.
p1
p2
min θ,1 − k{ 1}
firms 1 & 2
ration
Bertrand competition
min θ,1 − k{ 2}
firm 1 rations
firm 2 rations
Figure 1
As appears from inspection of Figure 1, the analysis developed by KS for the pricing games
under capacity constraints applies here in a truncated part of the strategy space. Lemma 1
characterizes equilibria in all possible price subgames.
6Lemma 1
Whenever x Dii∑ ≤ ( )θ , p ≡ θ  is the unique pure strategy equilibrium. Whenever
x Dii∑ ≥ ( )θ  , if the largest capacity x1 is less than r(x-1), the equilibrium is the pure
strategy P(x1+ x-1) , otherwise it is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Considering an oligopoly instead of a duopoly requires a different ordering of the
arguments used by KS in their lemmas 2 to 5 but no real novelty is introduced. Still, the
proof is somewhat technical and has been relegated to the appendix. We present here the
line of reasoning.
We start by showing that either the equilibrium is the pure strategy θ or that there
are more than two firms playing the lower bound p of all equilibrium distributions. Then
we show that those firms are constrained at p so that their equilibrium payoff is Πi ipx
*
= .
2
Next, we show that if the sum of capacities is lesser than D(θ) then the equilibrium has to
be θ because any firm is able to sell all of its capacity at this price. In the remaining cases
the equilibrium is in mixed strategies and we can introduce p P xi
*
≡ ∑( )  < θ. We then
show that firms who play the upper bound p of all equilibrium distributions satisfy i) or ii).
i) r x xi i−( ) <  and p P r x xi i= ( ) +( )− − : those firms have a large capacity and p does not
depend on it but on what other firms did choose.
ii) p p= * must hold in which case p* is the equilibrium.
Lastly, using a complex formula borrowed from KS, we show that firms playing p
in equilibrium have the same capacity and also the largest one.
Relying on Lemma 1, we may state our theorem which extends the result of KS to
oligopoly and imperfect commitment. For n symmetric firms and efficient rationing, the
Cournot outcome emerge as the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the capacity-
pricing game as soon as the ex-post marginal cost θ is larger than the Cournot price.
Theorem 1
If θ > P nx( ), the symmetric Cournot-Nash investment  x  followed by P(n  x ) is the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ. If θ < P nx( ), there is a continuum of SPE
who nevertheless satisfy D xi
i n
( )θ =
≤
∑ . It converges toward the Bertrand solution.
2
 In the KS setting, there are only two firms thus all firms derive this payoff which eases the rest of the proof.
7Proof If x D xi i≤ − −( )θ , the equilibrium of the pricing game played after ( )xi i n≤  is the
pure strategy θ and firm i's payoff in Γ is θxi. If D x x r xi i i( ) ( )θ − < ≤− − , the equilibrium is
the pure strategy P x xi i( )− +  and firm i is paid f x x x P x x c xi i i i i i( , ) ( ) ( )− −= + − . This
function is concave with a maximum at r x r xc i i( ) ( )− −< . If x r xi i> −( ), the equilibrium is
in mixed strategies and firm i earns g x x R x c xi i i i( , ) ( )− −= ( ) − .
Notice that P x xi i( )− + = θ  when x D xi i= − −( )θ  and g x r x f x r xi i i i− − − −( ) = ( ), ( ) , ( ) .
Hence the first period payoff as a function of xi is continuous. Moreover at x D xi i= − −( )θ ,
∂
∂ θ θ
f
x
x P x x c x
i
i i i i= + + − <−˙ ( ) ˙( )  and the slope of g is steeper than that of f as the second
period payoff becomes constant. The payoff function is thus concave in xi for any x-i; its
average over the equilibrium distributions of the others firms is concave too, meaning that
the best reply of firm i is always a pure strategy. Because this applies for all firms, the
equilibrium is in pure strategies and satisfies x D x r xi i c i= −{ }− −max ( ) , ( )θ  for all i.
If D x r xj c j( ) ( )θ − >− −  for some xj then D x xj j( )θ = +− . From this we deduce that
D x xi i( )θ = +−  must hold for all other firms, so that x r x D xi c i i= > −− −( ) ( )θ  is
impossible. Therefore the candidate equilibria are all vectors ( )xi i n≤  satisfying
D xi
i n
( )θ =
≤
∑  and D r x xc j j( ) ( )θ > +− −  for all j. The symmetric equilibrium D n( ) /θ  exists
if it is larger than the Cournot candidate  x  i.e., if θ ≤ P nx( ) the Cournot price. Solving for
D r y yc( ) ( )θ = +  yields a value y* that circumvents the range of asymmetric equilibria; they
are given by the constraint ∀ ≤ ≥i n x yi, * in addition to D xi
i n
( )θ =
≤
∑ , thus this set is a
simplex.
Now if θ >P nx( ), the equilibrium is unique. The case for n = 2 is KS, thus consider
n > 2 and let m x≡
− −1 2 . If x1 = rc(m +x2) and x2 = rc(m +x1), then x1 and x2 are solutions
of z h z r m r m zc c= ≡ + +( )( ) ( ) . But since 0 1> > −˙ ( )r zc  (cf. footnote 5) it must be the case
that ˙ ( ) ˙ ( ) ˙ ( )h z r m r m z r m zc c c= + +( ) + < 1, thus h has a unique fixed point so that x1 = x2.
By repetition of the argument to all pairs, we conclude that the equilibrium is unique and
symmetric: it is the Cournot quantity   x .♦
Figure 2 below illustrates our findings for n = 2, a linear demand D(p) = 1 − p and
zero marginal cost. The Cournot quantity 1/3 is found at the intersection of the two best
reply functions (dashed lines on Figure 2). If the sum of quantities x1 + x2 is less than D(θ)
= 1 − θ then firms are not able to avoid the traditionnal Bertrand competition, it is only for
large aggregate capacitites that the price equilibrium result in Cournot payoffs. Thus for θ >
1/3 (recall that the KS hypothesis was θ  > 1), very low capacity choices push firms toward
8the line D(θ) = x1 + x2, then for larger capacities the Cournot competition applies and leads
to the symmetric equilibrium choice of 1/3. For a θ' smaller than 1/3, the area where
Bertrand competition applies incorporates the previous equilibrium meaning that firms are
induce to build more capacity because the fierce price competition yield too small margins.
There is now a continüm of equilibria where firms share the market but not too
asymmetrically as the Cournot best replies provide lower bounds on one's equilibrium
capacity.
x1
x2
1−θ'
1/2 1
1−θ
Figure 2
4 )  FI NA L REMA RKS
Many researches have aimed at reconciling Cournotian outcomes with the explicit
price mechanism involved in the Bertrand model. These researches have been successful to
the extent that they have been able to combine the two features of oligopolistic industries
which are limited scales of production or increasing marginal costs and price setting
behaviour. The main challenge in this respect consists in dealing with the issue of
quantitative constraints (non-constant marginal cost) at the price competition stage which
tends to make it unprofitable for the firms to meet full demand. This in turn generates
rationing possibilities which are at the heart of the Edgeworth's critique.
The issue of rationing in pricing games is best understood by studying closely the
allocation process of a non competitive market with price-setting firms. Three stages are
needed to correctly describe this process. In the first stage firms name prices and consumers
address demand to firms. In the second one, firms decide on their sales and possibly ration
consumers. In the third stage, rationed consumers possibly report their demand to non-
rationing firms who may or may not accept them. In the case of homogeneous products and
9perfect display of prices, the low pricing firm receives all the demand at the end of the first
stage. Under constant returns to scale, this firm is willing to meet any demand level so that
it always choose to serve all consumers in the second stage; the third stage is then
irrelevant. With decreasing returns to scale, things are quite different because it may not be
optimal to meet full demand in the first stage.
Curiously enough, Edgeworth's classical approach has been abridged in several
recent papers. Their authors consider decreasing returns to scale; hence they have to deal
with the fact that firms are not always willing to meet demand. Yet, it is generally asserted
that "firms meet demand" without a word of explanation. There is neither reference to an
external mechanism that forces firms to meet demand nor reference to some reputation
effect in a larger game that would make this restriction tenable. Rationing is thus ruled out
by assumption. Replaced in our three stages process, we can interpret the equilibria of these
price competition games as Nash equilibria which are not subgame perfect. In those
equilibria indeed, each firm names a price and threaten its opponents to take the non
optimal decision to serve all of its clientele in the subsequent stage. Still the threat is never
carried out on the equilibrium path. Kuhn [1994], Maggi [1996], Bulow, Geanakoplos &
Klemperer [1985], Vives [1990], and Dastidar [1995], [1997] are prominent examples3
where such an odd vision of price competition is endorsed. 4
Yet what an economist probably has in mind when introducing quantitative
constraints into pricing models is not that firms commit to incur losses on high levels of
sales but rather commit not to call for such large sales, precisely because this would entail
losses. Obviously, when a firm names a price p, it does not threaten the other firms to make
losses by later selling units having a marginal cost larger than p. A firm has thus two basic
options when setting its price: it either undercuts opponents to receive a large demand and
possibly serves only a fraction of it or it charges a high price in order to benefit from
rationing spillovers.
Allowing for rationing drives us back to the analysis initiated by Edgeworth [1925]
and popularized by KS. In the setting of these last authors, the quantitative restriction may
seem too effective since it is physically impossible to produce beyond capacities at the
pricing stage. In the present paper we have thus considered the imperfect commitment of
Dixit [1980] within an oligopolistic framework. Our framework thus exhibits as its two
3
 The first two papers state the hypothesis implicitly, the next two use a footnote but without justification;
only Dastidar makes an effort by referring to Dixon [1990] (see the preceding footnote).
4What is lost exactly of the competition process when rationing is forbidden is largely an open question. In a
companion paper however we show that when rationing is forbidden within the KS framerwork, many SPE
outcomes , including the collusive ones can be sustained.
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polar cases the Bertrand and the KS's cost structure. We have then generalized of the
findings of KS in this framework to show that, depending on the value of the commitment,
the whole range of prices between Bertrand and Cournot prices can be sustained as part of
subgame perfect equilibria.
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Proof of Lemma 1
If the large capacity x1 is less than r x
−
( )1 , the equilibrium is the pure strategy
P x x1 1+( )− , otherwise it is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Proof W.l.o.g. firm 1 has the largest capacity in the subgame following the play of ( )xi i n≤ .
Let pi  and pi  be the lower and upper bounds of firm i's equilibrium distribution Fi. Let
H p
i n i
≡
≤
argmin , p p
i n i
≡
≤
min , H p
i n
i≡
≤
argmax  and p p
i n i
≡
≤
max .
Existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed by theorem 5 of Dasgupta & Maskin
[1986]. By lowering its price a firm always benefits from an increase in demand (this
property is not influenced by our rationing rule), its payoff is therefore left lower semi-
continuous (l.s.c.) in its price, thus weakly l.s.c.. The sum of payoffs is u.s.c. because
discontinuous shifts in demand occur only when two firms or more derive the same profit.
Claim 1 # >H 1 or the equilibrium is θ.
If # =H 1, some firm k enjoys demand D(pk) on p p
i H i
; min
∉#



 .
i) p < θ. If firm k is constrained at p its revenue is the strictly increasing function pkxk, a
contradiction to p being in the support of the equilibrium distribution Fk. Thus, D( p) < xk
and because pkD(pk) is a non-constant function, it must be the case that p is the monopoly
price P(r(0)). Since no other price (irrespective of what may play the other firms) can yield
the monopoly payoff, firm k must be playing the pure strategy P(r(0)) but then any other
firm i undercuts it, contradicting the optimality of its own equilibrium strategy.
ii) p ≥ θ. We are contemplating the classical Bertrand price competition whose outcome is
pricing at the marginal cost θ.
Claim 2 ∀ ∈ =i H pxi i, *Π
i) p < θ. If firm i H∈  deviates to p- (this is a shorthand for p − ε  where ε is a small
positive real number) its demand may jump upward; in order for p to be in the support of
an equilibrium distribution it must be the case that this does not happen, thus the payoff is
continuous at p. If the demand at p- is D( p-) it must be the case that p- < P(r(0)) for
12
otherwise firm i would deviate downward, thus D( p-) > r(0) which is an upper bound on
capacity investment5 as it is the optimal quantity with zero cost for a monopoly. Therefore
firm i is constrained at p and we get Πi ipx
*
= .
ii) p ≥ θ. We saw that θ is the unique possible price equilibrium. The claim is even valid for
all firms since sales beyond capacity neither generate losses nor benefits.
Claim 3 If x x D1 1+ ≤− ( )θ , θ is the unique price equilibrium.
The only case we need to consider is p < θ. If firm i plays θ− > p then the other
firms that are less expensive receives full demand but serve only their capacities so that
firm i receives more than D x xi i( )θ − ≥−  thus Π Πi i i iF xθ θ− − −( ) = >, * a contradiction.
From now on we study the case where p P x x* ≡ +( ) <
−1 1 θ.
Claim 4 H H HA B= ∪  where j H r x xA j j∈ ( ) <− if  and j H p pB∈ = if *
Let Ψj j j j j jp p x D p x( ) .min ,max , ( )≡ −{ }{ }−0  be the payoff to firm j when it names
a price pj > max{ }
i H i
p
∉
. If p pj i j i
≤
≠
max{ } then firm j gets at least the payoff Ψj jp( ), thus this
function must be maximal at p to sustain this price as a member of the support of an
equilibrium strategy. Firm j cannot be fully served at p+ for otherwise it would deviate
upward thus it will only sell units with zero marginal cost. Two cases can occur. If Ψj jp( )
= p D p xj j j( ) −( )−  in a neighbourhood of p; we study the alternate formulation of profits
yP y x j( )+ − . The argmax is r x j( )−  so that p P r x xj j= +( )− −( )  and since firm j is not
constrained at p, it must be true that r x xj j( )− < . Furthermore the equilibrium payoff in that
case is Π j jR x
* ( )=
−
 where R x r x P r x x( ) ( ) ( )≡ +( ) . Using the envelope theorem we obtain
˙ ( ) ( ) ˙ ( )R x r x P r x x= +( ) < 0. If on the other hand, Ψj jp( ) = xjpj at p- then the upper price is
p P x xj j= +( )−  and we have x r xj j≤ −( ) .
Claim 5 If HB ≠ ∅ , the equilibrium is p P x x* ≡ +( )
−1 1
5
 In a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium we can eliminate strictly dominated strategies in the first stage.
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Observe that p* guarantees the revenue p*xi to any firm i. Indeed, if all other firms
are less expensive, they are served first but the residual demand addressed to firm i is
precisely its capacity. If HB ≠ ∅ , the equilibrium must be the pure strategy p* for all firms.
Claim 6 If HB = ∅  then H HA= = { }1  i.e., the large capacity firm
Let j H HA∈ = . If x1 > xj then x x r x x r x xj j j− < − − − − −⇒ + < +1 1 1( ) ( )  as ˙( )r z > −1
(cf. footnote 5). Hence, firm 1 obtains a payoff R x
−
( ) ≤1 1Π* by naming P r x x( )− −+( )1 1  >
P r x x pj j( )− −+( ) = . We now prove that x R m x x R m xj j1 1+( )< +( ) where m x j= − −1  (zero
if n = 2). Let us define Θ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )z zR m z zr m z P m z r m z≡ + = + + + +( ). The envelope
theorem implies ˙ ( ) ( ) ( )Θ z r m z z P m z r m z= + −( ) + + +( ) . If r m x xj j( )+ <  then ˙Θ  < 0 and
we are done. Otherwise r m x xj j( )+ >  implies that r m x x( )+ =  is solved for a x* greater
than xj since r(.) is decreasing. By the same token, x* > xj implies that the solution y* to
r m x xj( )+ =  has to be greater than x*.  Finally, r m y xj( )*+ =  < x1 implies y* < x1. This is
crucial because the positiveness of ˙Θ  on [ ; ]*x xj  will be offset by its negativeness on the
large interval [ ; ]*x x1  as the following development shows.
Θ Θ Θ Θ Θ Θ Θ Θ( ) ( ) ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *
x x y x
y R r x x R m x y x P x r x x R m x
j x
x
x
x
x
x
x
y
j
j j j j j j j j
j j1
1 1
1
− = + ≤ + = −
= ( ) − + = +( ) − +
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫   
                             
                       
- -
= + + − +( ) <x y P x m y R m xj j j        by definition of R(.)* *( ) ( ) .0
So far we have proved that Π Π Πj j
j jR x
x
x
R x
x
x
* * *( ) ( )= < ≤ <
− −
1
1
1
1 1  which is equal to
p F p D p x F p D p1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11− − −−( ) + −( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . If firm j  plays p1−  it obtains demand
F p D p x F p D pj j− − − − −−( ) + −( )1 1 1 1 1 1 11( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) which is larger than the demand of firm 1
because there is more weight on the monopolistic demand term, therefore Π Πj j jp F1,
*
−
( ) >
the desired contradiction. We have thus shown that 1∈HA. Since p P r x xj j= +( )− −( )  holds
true for any j HA∈ , members of HA must have the same (largest) capacity.
 The two cases that occur in claim 4 now make sense: if a firm names prices larger
than other firms ( j HA∈ ), it must be the one with the greatest capacity and furthermore,the
excess must be large enough. ♦
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